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SECURITIES REGULATION-FRAuD-RULE 10B-5 No LONGER
SCARES THE JUDICIARY, BUT MAY SCARE CORPORATE DEFENDANTS: THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT SWITCHES DIRECTIONS. Wharf (Hold-
ings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
Securities' enjoy the peculiarity of being perhaps the most deviously
named product available. From the time of their inception, through the 1929
stock market crash, the savings and loan crises in the 1980s, and up through
the Enron debacle in 2000, securities have not been for the most part se-
cure.2 Nevertheless, in the wake of the largely unregulated speculation lead-
ing up to the stock market crash of 1929, the federal government imple-
mented an inclusive set of disclosure regulations that attempted to minimize
the risk inherent in the investment instrument itself.3 Most notably, federal
regulation of securities markets includes the Securities Act of 1933, which
regulates initial offerings of stock to the public, 4 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, which purports to regulate most other aspects of the
sale and resale of securities. 5
These Acts explicitly provide for various means of government en-
forcement; however, they also provide an implied source of private reme-
dies. 6 These implied remedies have become powerful weapons for both pri-
vate and state plaintiffs seeking to redress securities law violations arising
from marketplace transactions.7 Because of the utility of implied remedies
1. A "security" is defined as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of in-
debtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of de-
posit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights ... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity", [sic] or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or pur-
chase, any of the foregoing.
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2000).
2. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, Tim LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 1.2, at 6-9 (3d ed.
1996).
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111(2000).
6. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
7. For example, fifteen percent of the Securities Exchange Commission's (SEC) 1992
civil enforcement actions contained claims of aiding and abetting. Cent. Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 200 n.l1 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Aiding and abetting is to assist or facilitate the commission of a crime, or to promote its
accomplishment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999).
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and their well-established place in private suits, Rule lOb-5, 8 the Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) sweeping antifraud provision, has
emerged as the most encompassing antifraud provision of the federal securi-
ties laws.9 Initially, the scope of Rule lOb-5 was defined broadly.'0 Al-
though Rule lOb-5 provides an implied private right of action to victims of
securities fraud, the United States Supreme Court and the legislative branch
have, in the past, narrowed its overly broad scope." However, in Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc.,l1 the United States
Supreme Court departed from this narrowing trend and began to rely on
newly enacted legislative reform acts to limit Rule lOb-5's scope .
3
This note begins with the facts of Wharf, followed by a brief review of
the policy and history of section 10(b) 14 and Rule lOb-5. 5 Next, the note
discusses the elements of a 1Ob-5 cause of action. An examination of Rule
lOb-5 cases follows, including a sampling of decisions involving narrow
judicial interpretations of the rule. The note then discusses Congress's im-
plementation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA) 16 and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standard Act of 1998
(SLUSA).' 7 Part IV conducts an analysis of the Court's reasoning in Wharf,
where a unanimous Court held that a secret intent to not honor an oral op-
tions contract is a deceptive device in violation of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. The note concludes with a discussion of the significance of the
Court's departure from narrowly interpreting a Rule lOb-5 cause of action,
suggesting that the judiciary should avoid law making and rely on Con-
gress's interpretation of Rule lOb-5.
8. Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma-
terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
9. See HAZEN, supra note 2, § 13.2, at 763.
10. See infra Part 111.
11. See infra Part III.B-C.
12. 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
13. Id. at 594-96.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).
15. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4; see infra Part III.C.1.




In 1991 the Hong Kong government publicized its intent to grant an
exclusive license for the operation of a cable television system. 8 Wharf
(Holdings) Ltd. ("Wharf') is a Hong Kong company with holdings in trans-
portation, communications, and real estate.' 9 Wharf chose to prepare a bid
for the cable franchise.2° Peter Woo, Wharf's chairman, recognized that for
a successful bid, Wharf needed experienced partners with technical exper-
tise and credibility. 21 Soon after the announcement by the Hong Kong gov-
ernment, Wharf s managing director, Stephen Ng, initiated negotiations
with United International Holdings, Inc.'s ("United") Vice President Mark
Schneider to discuss the involvement of United, a Denver-based cable tele-
vision consulting and investment company, in preparing the bid for the
Hong Kong cable system.23 During this meeting, United agreed to provide
services to Wharf in exchange for the right to invest in the Hong Kong cable
system should Wharf obtain the license.24 In response to United's request
for ownership rights, Ng explained to Schneider that under the current law
in Hong Kong, United could not own more than ten percent of the cable
venture.25
In June 1992 Ng told Schneider that Wharf selected United as its cable
26partner. Beginning in August 1992, United's employees assisted Wharf in
creating the cable proposal while the two companies continued negotiations
about the details of United's payment.27 In the meantime, United sent em-
ployees to Hong Kong to assist in the project's negotiation, system design,
and financing.28 Wharf submitted an initial letter of intent to United, which
recognized both parties' intention to cooperate and invest in the Hong Kong
cable system.29 In a memo entitled "Corporate Structure and Sharehold-
ings," it was stated that United would hold ten percent of the company's
18. Wharf(Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 590 (2001); see
also United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1214 (10th Cir.
2000).
19. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532
U.S. 588 (2001) (No. 00-347).
20. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 590.
21. Id.; Brief for Respondent at 5, Wharf(No. 00-347).
22. Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 13:40.2 (2d ed. 2001).
23. United, 210 F.3d at 1214.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1214-15.
27. Wharf(Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 590 (2001).
28. Id.
29. Jd. at 590-91.
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share capital. 30 However, the memo also provided that it "does not create
legally binding and enforceable obligations and is intended to identify in
general terms a number of the principal matters forming the basis of the
cooperation between the parties.' In addition, the parties never signed any
of these agreements.32
In September 1992 Schneider attended Wharf's final bid preparations
in Hong Kong.33 On September 25 Wharf demonstrated a need to secure
sufficient technical expertise and entered into a Technical Cooperation
Agreement (TCA) with United.34 The TCA acknowledged that Wharf
wanted to keep the benefit of United's cable experience. 35 The TCA agree-
ment, however, described United as "an independent contractor," not as a
potential owner.36 Furthermore, the TCA specifically mentioned that any
modification to it must be in writing.37 Significantly, United signed the
TCA, and it represented the only signed agreement between the parties.38
Wharf finally submitted a bid on September 30, 1992, in which it pub-
licly told the Hong Kong government that the company would be the sole
owner of the cable system. 39 In part of its bid entitled "ownership structure,"
40Wharf had stated that it might consider United as an expert partner.
Wharf's non-committal language concerned United officials. 41 United un-
derstood, however, that the bid was structured only as a strategic move to
win the cable license.42
At a meeting on October 8, 1992, Ng requested that United continue to
provide well-trained employees to staff the venture until Wharf could hire
suitable permanent employees.43 United insisted that its officials would only
comply with Wharf's request if Wharf provided an enforceable right to
ownership in the cable system. 44 In response, Ng offered United an oral
option to invest in the cable system in exchange for United's services. 4' The
alleged terms of the right to invest were: (1) United had an option to pur-
chase ten percent of the cable system stock; (2) United's option purchase






36. United, 210 F.3d at 1215-16.
37. Id. at 1216.




42. United, 210 F.3d at 1216.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Wharf(Holdings) Ltd. v. United Int'l Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 591 (2001).
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price was ten percent of the equity capital required to fund the project, less
United's expenses and the value of United's previous services; (3) United's
option was exercisable only if United demonstrated its ability to fund its
portion of the project's equity capital requirements for eighteen months; and
(4) the option expired if not exercised by United within six months after
Wharf received the franchise.46 The parties never reduced this agreement to
writing.47 Ng later denied granting United an oral option to purchase securi-
ties in its cable system.48
On May 27, 1993, the Hong Kong government awarded the cable fran-
chise to Wharf4 9 In turn, United conducted a public offering of its stock to
finance its initial investment in Wharf's cable system pursuant to the oral
options contract.50 In late July or early August, United informed Ng that it
was ready to exercise its option, but Wharf refused to sell United stock in
the cable system.51
During this time, internal Wharf documents suggested that Wharf
never intended to honor the option Ng orally granted United.5 2 For instance,
on September 9, 1992, after a Wharf board meeting, Ng wrote a letter to an
executive: "Didn't get very far with the Chairman! More interested in a
telecom partner! How do we get out? '53 Additionally, a few weeks before
the October 8, 1992 meeting,54 Wharf's Chairman Woo wrote, "No, no, no,
we don't accept that" in a memorandum stating that United was interested
in investing in the Hong Kong cable system.5 Despite Wharf's internal re-
pudiation of United's right to invest, however, Schneider attended Wharf's
station launch on October 31, 1993, and, after the launch, Ng urged Schnei-
der to be patient.56 But in a November 24 document titled "Biweekly Meet-
ing with Chairman," an executive noted that Wharf should "start to back
pedal, and activate Technical Cooperation Agreement., 57 In December 1992
United submitted another memorandum of understanding to Wharf, stating
that United's possibility of ownership was contingent upon Wharf's board
46. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 4, Wharf (No. 00-347).
47. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 591.
48. United, 210 F.3d at 1216-17.
49. Wharf 532 U.S. at 591; United, 210 F.3d at 1217.
50. United, 210 F.3d at 1217. United conducted a public offering to finance an amount
of $66,000,000 (its ten percent share according to the October 8 agreement's requirements).
Id
51. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 591; United, 210 F.3d at 1217.
52. Wharf 532 U.S. at 591-92; United, 210 F.3d at 1217-18.
53. United, 210 F.3d at 1218.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
55. Wharf 532 U.S. at 591.
56. United, 210 F.3d at 1218.
57. Id For the terms of the TCA, see supra text accompanying notes 34-38. In another
Wharf document entitled "Agenda for Meeting with Chairman," the word "stall" appeared
beside the heading giving United possible partnership. United, 210 F.3d at 1219.
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approval. 8 Ng's copy of the memo says "be careful, must deflect this.
How?, 59 A December 11 internal Wharf document explained that the com-
pany did not want United's oral options agreement to bind Wharf s ac-
60tions.
On March 18, 1994, after continuous efforts by United to exercise the
oral option contract, Schneider met with Wharf s board to express United's
desired involvement and to request a right to invest in Wharf.6' Approxi-
mately two hours after the meeting, Ng informed Schneider that the board
was not willing to consider United's investment.62
United initiated suit in November 1994 against Wharf63 for its refusal
to allow United to invest in the Hong Kong cable television franchise under
the oral agreement pursuant to section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. 64 United contended that the services it rendered
to Wharf were part of a mutual understanding that United would purchase
ten percent of Wharf s stock in the Hong Kong cable system. In April
1997 a federal jury in Colorado found that Wharf did not fulfill its obliga-
tion under the oral agreement to sell ten percent of its stock to United and
awarded United compensatory and punitive damages of over
$125,000,000.66 Wharf appealed the decision, and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.67 Wharf further appealed the de-
cision to the United States Supreme Court.68 On May 21, 2001, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit, holding that Wharf's grant of an oral op-
tion to buy securities, while secretly intending to deny United's exercise of
58. United, 210 F.3d at 1218.
59. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 592.
60. United, 210 F.3d at 1218. Another confidential document stated:
[P]roper legal disclaimers have been inserted in the language so as to not bind us
to [United's] representation which speaks to an "opportunity" to acquire a [ten
percent] interest in Wharf Cable. Our next move should be to claim that our di-
rectors got quite upset over these representations and have therefore instructed
us to "settle up" on the [TCA] only. Publicly, we do not acknowledge the oppor-
tunity and speak only to [United's] involvement vis-a-vis the [TCA].
Id. (alterations in original).
61. Id. at 1219.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Wharf, 532 U.S. at 593; see infra Part III.B.
65. United, 210 F.3d at 1219.
66. Wharf 532 U.S. at 592; see also John Accola, Decision Against Wharf Upheld
State's Largest Jury Award Withstands High Court Test, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 22,
2001, at lB.
67. United, 210 F.3d at 1237. The court held, "we are convinced that [United]'s allega-
tions not only aie substantial and nonfrivolous, but state an actionable lob-5 claim .
Brief of Respondent at 16-17, Wharf (No. 00-347).
68. See Wharf, 532 U.S. at 588.
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the option, violated section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.69
III. BACKGROUND
Since the inception of Rule 1Ob-5, a victim of fraudulent or deceptive
practices by a seller or purchaser of securities has had a particular statutory
remedy that falls outside the common law remedy for fraud.7° In fact, the
number of suits brought pursuant to Rule 1Ob-5 has steadily increased due
to the broad scope of liability under Rule 1 Ob-5 .7 1 For many years, attempts
to persuade Congress to pass a statutory definition of fraud were unavailing;
therefore, fearing the adverse effects of excessive litigation, the judiciary
began to restrict the scope of Rule 1Ob-5 .72 Furthermore, legislative inter-
vention has also addressed this concern.73 After a glimpse into the history
and policy underlying federal securities regulation under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, this section will describe a Rule lOb-5 cause of action and the
judiciary's narrow interpretation of its elements. This section concludes
with a discussion of the PSLRA and SLUSA, Congress's attempts to reform
Rule lOb-5's broad scope.
A. History and Policy of Securities Regulation: The Intent of Section
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the fundamental pur-
pose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to implement a philosophy
of full disclosure in securities transactions.74 The legislative intent to accord
broad application of section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 has served to justify the
prohibition of various deceptive acts, devices, or contrivances in connection
with securities deals.75 A plaintiff does not have to show an actual intent by
the wrongdoer to influence the price of a security; rather, the plaintiff need
only show that the wrongdoer's action caused a reasonable investor to alter
his or her mind, thereby affecting value.76
69. Id. at 588, 597. The Court held that an option was a security under Rule lOb-5; that
an oral contract was within the scope of Rule lOb-5; and that the sale of an option with a
secret intent not to honor it violated Rule lOb-5. Id. For a thorough analysis of the Court's
reasoning, see infra Part IV.
70. See supra note 8.
71. See infra Part III.B.
72. See infra Part III.B.
73. See infra Part III.C.
74. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001).
76. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976). Judge Friendly of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit expanded on this idea:
2002]
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In 1946 a federal district court held in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co. 77 that absent an express private right of action, Rule 1Ob-5 gives rise to
an implied private remedy in the hands of injured investors.78 However, it
was not until twenty-four years later that the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged this implied private right of action.79 Nevertheless, since
Kardon, the implied remedy in Rule lOb-5 has remained firmly en-
trenched.80 However, the courts have limited the breadth (or scope) of Rule
lOb-5 in many respects. 81 For example, the United States Supreme Court
has limited standing for a plaintiff to bring a Rule lOb-5 suit,82 precluded
private suits for aiding and abetting violations,83 required proof of scienter
in suits for both damages 84 and injunctive relief,85 reduced the average pe-
riod of the statute of limitations for suits, 86 limited the occasions on which
use of inside information violates the rule, 87 and imposed a stringent test for
tippee liability.
88
The purpose of [section] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is to protect persons who are de-
ceived in securities transactions-to make sure that buyers of securities get what
they think they are getting and that sellers of securities are not tricked into part-
ing with something for a price known to the buyer to be inadequate or for a con-
sideration known to the buyer not to be what it purports to be.
Chem. Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 943 (2d Cir. 1984).
77. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
78. See id at 513-14.
79. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971) ("It
is now established that a private right of action is implied under [section] 10(b)" and Rule
10b-5.).
80. There are numerous writings about the evolution of Rule lob-5 and its remedy. See,
e.g., 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS ON
SECURMEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 1.0-3.2 (2d ed. 1996); Craig J. Cobine,
Elements of Liability and Actual Damages in Rule lob-5 Actions, U. ILL. L.F. 651 (1972);
David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of the Legislative In-
tent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 627 (1963).
81. See infra Part III.B.
82. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
83. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
84. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
85. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 702 (1980).
86. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 352-57
(1991); see also Christopher R. Leslie, Den of Inequity: The Case for Equitable Doctrines in
Rule J0b-5 Cases, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1587, 1608 (1993).
87. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
88. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). A tippee is defined as a person who ac-
quires material nonpublic information from someone in a fiduciary relationship with the
company to which that information pertains. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 718 (7th ed. 1999).
When the insider provides this information to the tippee in breach of the insider's fiduciary
duty to the corporation, and the tippee knows or should know of the breach, then the tippee




B. Section 10(b) and Its Weapon of Choice, Rule 1Ob-5: The Judiciary
Interferes
The SEC promulgated Rule 1Ob-5 as a remedy for securities fraud
available under the Securities Exchange Act. 89 Section 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 provides that it is unlawful "[t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security... any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." 90 The SEC has
recognized and utilized this rulemaking power in many instances, 91 and in
Rule lOb-5 it created its most encompassing prohibition.92 It is clear that
Rule 1 Ob-5's broad language could have potentially prohibited a large group
of activities.93
To state an effective claim under Rule 1Ob-5, a plaintiff must prove
that there was fraud or deceit 94 by any person in connection with the pur-
chase or sale95 of any security. 96 Furthermore, because Rule 10b-5 requires
some type of fraud, the elements of common law fraud also apply, such as
materiality and reliance. 97 Since its adoption, Rule 1 Ob-5 has proven to be a
powerful weapon against securities fraud.98 However, the broad language of
Rule 1 Ob-5 created potential unlimited liability.
99
89. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). See generally Milton Freeman, Happy Birthday J0b-
5: 50 Years ofAntifraud Regulation, 61 FORDHAM L. REv., at SI (1993).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). See generally Steve Thel, The Original Conception of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1980).
91. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-1 to-18.
92. Id. § 240.10b-5; see HAZEN, supra note 2, at 763.
93. See supra note 8.
94. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); see also infra Part III.B.1.
95. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975). Only
actual purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to bring a Rule 1Ob-5 cause of ac-
tion, not potential purchasers or sellers. Id.
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
97. Some courts have identified six principal elements of a Rule lob-5 claim: "(1) a
misstatement or omission (2) of a material (3) fact (4) with scienter (5) upon which the plain-
tiff justifiably relied (6) that proximately caused the plaintiffs' [sic] damages." Bently v.
Legent Corp., 849 F. Supp. 429, 431 (E.D. Va. 1994); see infra Part III.B.4. A statement is
material if there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important
to affect his or her decision. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). Scienter is
defined as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst &
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
98. According to the leading advocate of Rule lOb-5, Milton Freeman:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the
SEC building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was
then the director of the Trading and Exchanged Division. He said, "I have just
2002]
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By employing such broad language as the phrases "in connection with"
and "any security," section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 reach a wide range of acts
and schemes that may defraud investors.'00 Because of this broad potential
interpretation, both the judiciary and the legislature have begun to narrow
the scope of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 due to the fear that frivolous liti-
gation or unfair results would occur.'0 ' The United States Supreme Court
observed that Rule I Ob-5 represented a "judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn," badly in need of pruning because of the
potential overbreadth of its language.'
0 2
In the last three decades, the Supreme Court has generally embraced a
restrictive view of Rule lOb-5's reach. 10 3 While earlier decisions read the
been on the telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the SEC Regional Ad-
ministrator in Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company
in Boston who is going around and buying up the stock of his company from his
own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the com-
pany is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadru-
pled and will be $2.00 a share for the coming year. Is there anything we can do
about it?" So he came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Sec-
tion 10(b) and I looked at Section 17, and I put them together, and the only dis-
cussion we had there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale"
should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Summer
Pike who said, "Well, we are against fraud, aren't we?"
Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967);
see also Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 767.
99. See supra note 8.
100. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152 (1972). In
Affiliated Ute, the Court held that employees violated l0b-5 by misstating a material fact,
namely, that the prevailing market price of the shares was the figure at which non-Indians
made the purchases, and the activities of the employees constituted a "course of business" or
a "device, scheme or artifice" that operated as a fraud on the Indian sellers. Id.; see also
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (holding that sec-
tion 10(b) bars deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities in
face-to-face or market transactions).
101. See infra notes 103-11 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II1.C.
102. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 737.
103. For reviews of this trend, see Douglas M. Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court
Approach to SEC Rule lob-5 andInsider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981); James D. Cox,
Choices: Paving the Road Toward a "Definition" of Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REv. 381,
390 (1988); C. Larimore Whitaker & James E. Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counter-
Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REv. 335 (1979). See also Cent. Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 352-57 (1991); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
660 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222
(1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 723.
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language of section 10(b) "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes,"'10 4 the Court has since construed these
provisions with more skepticism and has limited much of Rule 1Ob-5's po-
tency.
105
1. The Fraud Element
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court narrowed section 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 when it wandered from the broad statutory language and con-
cluded that mismanagement does not constitute deceptive or manipulative
behavior, and therefore, did not give rise to any action for securities
fraud. 10 6 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Court held that a claim of
fraud under Rule 1 Ob-5 could only succeed if the conduct alleged can be
fairly viewed as manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of section
10(b). 10 7 The case involved a majority shareholder's use of a short-form
merger to oust the corporation's minority shareholders.108 Rather than ac-
cept the appraisal remedy available to them under state law, some of the
excluded shareholders challenged the transaction under Rule lOb-5.'0 9 The
Court dismissed the suit and ruled that the adequate disclosure provided to
the shareholders'' 0 rendered the transaction neither "deceptive" nor "ma-
nipulative" under Rule 1Ob-5 and section 10(b). 11 The United States Su-
preme Court further justified the ruling by noting that the "language of [sec-
tion] 10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct
not involving manipulation or deception."'"1 2 Therefore, after Santa Fe, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant tricked him or her into entering into
the particular transaction before he or she can satisfy the fraud element in a
Rule 1Ob-5 private action." 3
104. Affiliated Ute Citizens, 406 U.S. at 151 (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bur., Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)); see also Bankers Life & Cas., 404 U.S. at 12;
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
105. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
106. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977).
107. Id. at 472. The United States Supreme Court later clarified by stating that whether a
complaint states a cause of action for "fraud" (scienter) under Rule lOb-5, "we turn first to
the language of [section] 10(b), for '[t]he starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself."' Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)
(alterations in original).
108. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 465.
109. Id. at 466-67.
110. Id. at 474 n.14 (holding that the failure to give advance notice of the merger was not
a material nondisclosure); see also Harvey Gelb, Rule lob-5 and Santa Fe-Herein of Sue
Facts, Shame Facts, and Other Matters, 87 W. VA. L. REv. 189, 192 (1983).
111. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 474-77.




2. The "In Connection with the Purchase or Sale" Element
The judiciary has long assumed that any statement found to affect the
investment decisions of reasonable investors would achieve the "in connec-
tion with" requirement. 14 In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,'
15
however, the United States Supreme Court again chipped away at Rule 1 Ob-
5's broad scope when it held that a plaintiff must be an actual purchaser or
seller of securities to have standing to bring a Rule lOb-5 claim. 16 In Blue
Chip Stamps, the plaintiff belonged to a class of retailers to whom defendant
Blue Chip Stamps was obligated to offer a substantial number of its shares
pursuant to an antitrust consent decree." 7 The suit alleged that the prospec-
tus for the offering presented a pessimistic assessment of Blue Chip Stamps
to discourage the retailers from buying the shares at the below-market price
to which the decree entitled them." 8 Without rejecting the truth of the alle-
gation, the Court dismissed the Rule I Ob-5 action because the plaintiffs
asserted injury did not derive from the purchase or sale of Blue Chip
Stamps's stock.' 19 In turn, the Court held that would-be purchasers could
not state a Rule lOb-5 cause of action.120 The outcome of this holding is that
potential sellers or buyers of securities do not have standing to raise Rule
lOb-5 claims, even if a fraudulent scheme or device affected their decision
not to purchase or sell securities.
1 21
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that an oral contract for sale can be the basis of a Rule
1 Ob-5 claim in Threadgill v. Black. 22 In this case, the complaint alleged that
Threadgill was a shareholder of B&W Productions, Inc., a corporation con-
trolled by Black. 23 Threadgill was to receive money in exchange for giving
114. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-61 (2d Cir. 1968) (hold-
ing that misstatements in a corporate press release were made "in connection with" purchases
or sales made by shareholders in the open market and violated Rule lOb-5, even though the
corporation itself was neither buying nor selling shares).
115. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 725-26.
118. Id. at 726-27.
119. Id. at 745-46.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Calenti v. Boto, 24 F.3d 335, 339 (1st Cir. 1994) (alleging misstatements
in connection with proposed amendment to articles of incorporation that would eliminate the
right to redeem preferred shares was not actionable under lOb-5 as there was neither a pur-
chase nor a sale); see also Ruff v. Genesis Holding Corp., 728 F. Supp. 225, 229 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that an offeree was only a would-be purchaser and thus lacked Rule lob-5
standing).
122. 730 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). However, the parties must have made
an enforceable contract. Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1984).
123. Threadgill, 730 F.2d at 811.
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up his ownership rights in B&W, but Black refused to execute a written
memorandum stating such an agreement. 124 The Threadgill court held that
"fraud in the purchase or sale includes '[e]ntering into a contract of sale [of
a security] with the secret reservation not to fully perform."",125 This in-
cluded oral contracts of sale.
126
3. The "Any Security" Element
Rule 1Ob-5 applies to any kind of entity that issues something which
can be classified as a "security," 127 regardless of whether the security is reg-
istered under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.128 Therefore, Rule lOb-5's broad scope has allowed it to be invoked
in many situations. 129 In the history of securities regulation, the judiciary
has defined a variety of objects as securities other than those mentioned in
either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.130
4. The Common Law Elements: Materiality and Reliance in Rule
10b-5 Actions
In a common law action for fraud or deceit, the successful plaintiff
must prove a material misstatement or omission and reliance upon it.' 31 As
is the case with the common law action, the materiality and reliance re-
quirements also apply to Rule 1Ob-5 causes of action.'
32
124. Id.
125. Id. at 811-12 (quoting Walling v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir.
1973)).
126. Id.
127. See supra note 1.
128. See infra note 130.
129. See supra note 1; see also infra note 130.
130. See supra note 1; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (fruit
trees); Bailey v. T.W.K. Props., Inc., 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990) (animal feeding pro-
grams); Eberhardt v. Waters, 901 F.2d 1578 (11th Cir. 1990) (cattle embryos); Threadgill,
730 F.2d at 811 (oral contracts); Bell v. Health-Mar, Inc., 549 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977) (vac-
uum cleaners); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974) (cosmetics);
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973) (self-improvement
courses); Cont'l Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1967) (beavers); Kolibash v.
Sagittarius Recording Co. 626 F. Supp. 1173 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (master recording contracts);
SEC v. M.A. Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973) (scotch whiskey); Halloway v.
Thompson, 42 N.E.2d 421 (Ind. App. 1942) (cemetery lots); State v. Robbins, 240 N.W. 456
(Minn. 1932) (muskrats).
131. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 108 (5th
ed. 1984).




Information is material when a reasonable investor would have consid-
ered the matter significant in making investment decisions;' 33 it is not nec-
essary, however, to show that the investor would have acted differently.1
34
The fact that a court will determine materiality in context means that a pur-
chaser or seller is not necessarily entitled to all information relating to each
of the circumstances surrounding the transaction.1 35 Courts have held, for
example, that failure to disclose negotiations concerning post-redemption
plans for plaintiffs shares is not a material nondisclosure. 136 However, a
court will likely find information tending to show conflicts of interest of
directors, officers, or other major participants to be material. 137 Similarly,
facts pertaining to management integrity are likely to be material. 
138
The test of materiality depends not upon the literal truth of statements,
but upon the ability of reasonable investors to become accurately in-
formed. 139 Accordingly, when there is adequate cautionary language warn-
ing investors as to certain risks, optimistic statements are not materially
misleading.1 40 However, the mere fact that information may be publicly
available does not mean that it is necessarily incorporated in every state-
ment made. 141
133. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988) (holding that the "determination
[of materiality] requires delicate assessments of the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder'
would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to him .... )
(quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)) (alteration in original). It
is not sufficient to show that information is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is
not significant. Id. at 238. It is not sufficient to show that a shareholder might have found the
information to be of interest. Milton v. Van Dorn Co., 961 F.2d 965, 968-69 (1st Cir. 1992).
134. Folger Adam Co. v. PMI Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1529, 1532-33 (2d Cir. 1991).
135. See, e.g., Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 791-93 (5th Cir. 1988).
Management's motives frequently will not be material, and therefore, need not be disclosed.
Id. at 791. Where the total mix of information showed a bleak financial picture, the court
held that overly optimistic statements by the incoming chairman of the board were not mate-
rial. Data Controls N., Inc. v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 688 F. Supp. 1047, 1057 (D. Md. 1988).
136. Trecker v. Scag, 747 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1984). Especially if the plaintiff had little
choice in the matter. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965).
137. See, e.g., Kahn v. Wien, 842 F. Supp. 667, 677-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
138. E.g., Colonial Ltd. P'ship Sec. Litig., 854 F. Supp. 64 (D. Conn. 1994) (holding that
reasons for discharge of general partner were material).
139. E.g., McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entm't, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir.
1990) ("Some statements, although literally accurate, can become, through their context and
manner of presentation, devices which mislead investors.").
140. See, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1415 (1994).





The reliance requirement is a corollary of materiality. 142 The United
States Supreme Court, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 143 held that
in a face-to-face transaction between seller and purchaser where the defen-
dant purchaser omitted material facts, the plaintiffs reliance can be pre-
sumed from the materiality of the omissions.' 44 The Court held that upon a
finding of materiality, it is then up to the defendant to prove that the plain-
tiff did not in fact rely on the material omissions. 14 Many subsequent dis-
trict court and court of appeals decisions have followed this presumption of
reliance, but have refused to extend this ruling to the extent of eliminating
the reliance requirement from a Rule 1Ob-5 claim, even in face-to-face
transactions.
146
C. The Need for Reform: Factors Leading to Legislative Intervention
As discussed in Part III.B, by employing such broad language as the
phrases "in connection with" and "any security," section 10(b) and Rule
1 Ob-5 reach a wide range of acts and schemes that may defraud investors.
147
Because of this broad statutory language, the legislature has also begun to
narrow the scope of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 because of the fear that
frivolous litigation or unfair results would occur.
Many factors caused Congress to maintain the implied liability of Rule
1 Ob-5 in a narrow manner. Abuses of Rule 1 Ob-5 have caused severe conse-
quences; for example, supporters of reform assert that individuals use Rule
1Ob-5 to hedge the risk of investment. 148 Such abuse occurs when investors
simply sue under Rule 1Ob-5 to recover from an unexpected loss. 149 Addi-
142. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
143. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
144. Id. at 153-54.
145. Id. at 152-53.
146. See, e.g., DuPont v. Brady, 828 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1987) (placing burden of rebut-
ting the presumption of reliance on defendant lawyer); Barnes v. Res. Royalties, Inc., 795
F.2d 1359 (8th Cir. 1986) (presuming reliance in face-to-face transactions).
147. See supra Part III.B.
148. See 138 CONG. REc. 23,475-80, 23,151-52 (1992) (statement of Sen. Domenici and
Rep. Tauzin). Both Senator Domenici and Representative Tauzin alleged that speculators
were instituting suits under Rule lob-5 to recover investment losses. Id. at 23,475, 23,151.
Senator Domenici further stated that an individual may employ a lawsuit investment hedge
regardless of whether the stock price moves up or down, because any move in the price of a
stock produces losses. Id. at 23,475.
149. See id. at 23,476; see also Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 635 F. Supp. 399, 405 (D.
Mass. 1985) (admonishing the plaintiff that Rule lob-5 was not designed to provide recovery
for an ordinary investment loss), affd, 814 F.2d 798, 806 (1st Cir. 1987).
2002]
UALR LAW REVIEW
tional abuse of Rule 1 Ob-5 occurs when speculators coerce large settlements
from defendants. 50
These perceived abuses of Rule 1Ob-5 have adversely affected the na-
tional economy.151 For example, the increased incidence of securities fraud
litigation has discouraged experienced directors and officers from sitting on
the boards of directors of publicly held corporations.' 52 Although Rule
1Ob-5 abuses do exist, 53 there are other underlying issues that are partially
responsible for the perceived abuses attributed to Rule 1Ob-5 litigation.
These underlying issues include the perception of excess litigation in soci-
ety and the abuse of class action litigation.
54
Over the past decades, debate about the perception of litigation as a na-
tional pastime has forcefully ensued. 55 The love for litigation that Ameri-
cans share hinders national competitiveness by discouraging the develop-
ment of new products, increasing unemployment,' 56 and flooding the courts
with frivolous cases that expend judicial time and effort more appropriately
reserved for meritorious suits. 57 Politicians and scholars have argued that
Congress or the judiciary should somehow restrict access to. the courts. 158
Consistent with this trend, litigation reform efforts have recently focused on
restricting suits under Rule 1Ob-5, an effort that is explored in the following
sections.
Supporters of Rule lob-5 reform assert that under current principles of
securities litigation, the settlement values of meritless suits are identical to
meritorious ones. 159 This encourages frivolous litigation because the incen-
tive for a plaintiff to bring a meritless securities fraud suit is the same as the
150. See 138 CONG. REc. at 23,475-76.
151. See id. at 23,475.
152. See id
153. See, e.g., Kennedy, 635 F. Supp. at 405.
154. See infra notes 155-66 and accompanying text.
155. Compare WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1991) (arguing that
America is experiencing an increase in lawsuits whether meritorious or not), with Marc Gal-
anter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983)
(analyzing data on the way society currently processes disputes and arguing that claims that
America is an overly litigious society draw upon weak scholarship and flawed policy analy-
sis).
156. See 138 CONG. REc. at 23,475.
157. See Marc Galanter, Pick a Number, Any Number, AM. LAW., Apr. 1992, at 82.
158. See, e.g., Joe Queenan, Birth of a Notion, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1992, at C1 (re-
porting that Vice President Dan Quayle argued that litigation costs Americans $80 billion
dollars per annum); Nancy E. Roman, Angry at Bush and Quayle, Lawyers Pour Funds to
Clinton, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at A5 (reporting that Vice President Dan Quayle had
argued repeatedly that there are "too many lawyers and too much litigation and that frivolous
lawsuits increase medical costs, consumer costs, and insurance premiums").
159. See 138 CONG. REC. at 23,475 (1992).
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incentive to bring a meritorious one.' 60 Nevertheless, the threat of a class
action heightens the vigilance of would-be defendants and promotes the
enforcement of the securities laws. 16 1 One author describes the importance
of the class action to securities fraud litigation as "essential to the integrity
of our financial markets."'
162
As discussed above, the courts have placed significant limitations on
securities fraud under Rule lOb-5 by limiting its exponential scope. 163 More
significantly, Congress, in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 (PSLRA), 164 sought to prevent the filing of frivolous securities fraud
suits by heightening the standard for pleading scienter. 165 When plaintiffs
reacted to PSLRA by seeking to file class actions in state courts, Congress,
in the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA),
166
mandated that most class actions alleging securities fraud must be filed in
federal court. 167 The limitations placed on Rule 1Ob-5 suits by the courts
and Congress provide a number of new weapons, such as heightened plead-
ing, to defendants to combat securities fraud suits filed under Rule 1Ob-5.
Nevertheless, this implied right of action is apt to continue as a fertile
source of significant litigation.
1. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
In an attempt to limit the broad interpretation of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, Congress enacted the PSLRA.168 While the PSLRA mainly focuses
on meritless strike suits,' 69 the final bill extended far beyond the regulation
of frivolous litigation. 70 The PSLRA establishes uniform pleading stan-
160. See id. Securities suits that take the form of a class action have a predisposition
toward abusive litigation because the merits of such cases are irrelevant. See Janet Cooper
Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43
STAN. L. REv. 497, 517 (1991). This study did not, however, single out litigation under Rule
1Ob-5, nor does it support sweeping reform of Rule lOb-5. Id.
161. See William Lerach, Counterpoint: Class Action Suits Help Keep Predators Away,
SAN JOSE Bus. J., May 25, 1992, at 7.
162. Id.
163. See supra Part III.B.
164. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000); see infra Part II.C. 1.
165. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000); see infra Part III.C.2.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 77p.
168. Stephen Muniz, Note, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Pro-
tecting Corporations from Investors, Protecting Investors from Corporations, and Promoting
Market Efficiency, 31 NEw ENG. L. REv. 655, 690 (1997).
169. See David M. Brodsky, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Prin-
cipal Provisions, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 1265, 1267, 1283 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-958, 1996).
170. See Jeffrey Silva, Lawmakers Bring to Floor New Securities Litigation, RCR RADIO
COMM. REP., May 26, 1997.
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dards among federal courts. 17 1 Thus, in order to bring a securities action in
federal court the complaint must specifically set forth the facts giving "rise
to a 'strong inference' that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind.' 72 It additionally requires the complaint to specify each alleged mis-
leading statement, why it is misleading, and to state with particularity all
facts that form reasonable belief.'73
The PSLRA also prevents liability for statements made by company
representatives that were not known to be false at the time they were made,
or that were accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements. 174 Addi-
tionally, the PSLRA provides a stay on discovery during the pendency of a
dismissal motion. 175 Congress intended the discovery provision to end the
frivolous claims previously brought under the Court's broad interpretation
of liability under Rule lOb-5.176 Despite the goals of the PSLRA, the fact
remains that it is only applicable at the federal level, leaving the states in
limbo as to what the standards should be.
177
2. The Aftermath: Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998
Although the PSLRA appeared to address legislative concerns, 178 a
loophole enabled attorneys to initiate meritless lawsuits in state courts that
Congress clearly intended to bar. 179 Because the heightened pleading stan-
171. See Marksman Partners v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297, 1311 (C.D.
Cal. 1996) (indicating Congress intended to create uniform pleading standard).
172. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
174. Id. § 78u-4(b)(l)(B) (2000); see Patrick J. Coughlin & Eric A. Isaacson, Commenc-
ing Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"'), in
SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 9, 15 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B-958, 1996).
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B); see John L. Latham & Jenna L. Fruechtenicht, Securi-
ties Regulation, 48 MERCER L. REv. 1677, 1687-88 (1997). A stay on discovery during the
pendency of a dismissal motion is burdensome for plaintiffs because, without discovery,
plaintiffs often cannot survive a defendant's motion to dismiss. See Latham & Fruechtenicht,
supra, at 1687-88.
176. See supra Part III.B.
177. See Bruce G. Vanyo et al., Securities Class Action Litigation in State Courts, in
SECURITIES LITIGATION 1996, at 207, 401 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B-958, 1996).
178. See Denis T. Rice, A Practitioner's View of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 283, 324 (1997).
179. See generally Nicholas E. Chimicles, The Future of Securities Litigation Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 1 SWEEPING REFORM: LITIGATING AND
BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAWS 1996, at 591, 616 (PLI Corp. Law
& Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-923, 1996).
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dards of the PSLRA only apply in federal courts, 180 attorneys began filing
suit in state courts where the heightened standards do not apply.'81 The re-
sult was an explosion of securities litigation in state courts.'82 The PSLRA
had essentially been rendered ineffective due to the ability of claimants to
side step the heightened requirements by filing in state court. 83 In response,
Congress passed the SLUSA, which requires removal of class actions to
federal court, thereby preventing Rule 1 Ob-5 suits in state court. 84
According to reform supporters, the PSLRA and SLUSA, in a com-
bined effort, balance private civil enforcement of the securities laws with
the needs of properly functioning capital markets. 185 Numerous examples
now exist of courts implementing the heightened standards of proof of the
PSLRA, dismissing actions where plaintiffs are unable to allege concrete
wrongdoing and scienter, and staying state court action brought in contra-
vention to SLUSA. 186 While legislative reform tactics have not ended all
180. See Vanyo, supra note 182, at 401.
181. See Stuart J. Baskin, Recent Developments in State Securities, Derivative and Cor-
porate Law, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 449, 451 (PLI Corp. L. and Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. B-958, 1996).
182. See Securities Litigation Abuses, 1997: Before the Sec. Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Richard I.
Miller, General Counsel, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) (reiterating that
plaintiffs were still filing cases that did not meet the federal court standards in state courts
and bringing about the same "coercive pressure to settle meritless claims that Congress
sought to eliminate") [hereinafter Miller Statement]; see also Concerning the Implementation
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Before the Subcomm. on Fin. and
Hazardous Materials, 105th Cong. 21 (1997) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC)
(explaining that since the PSLRA created a loophole, securities litigation plaintiffs began to
file in state court because of the lack of heightened pleading and the discovery stay does not
apply).
183. See Miller Statement, supra note 182.
184. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (2000). Congress stated its objectives:
(1) the [PSLRA] sought to prevent abuses in private securities fraud lawsuits; (2)
since enactment of that legislation, considerable evidence has been presented...
that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to
State courts; (3) this shift has prevented that Act from fully achieving its objec-
tives; ... and (4) in order to prevent certain State private securities class action
lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the
[PSLRA], it is appropriate to enact national standards for securities class action
lawsuits involving nationally traded securities, while preserving the appropriate
enforcement powers of State securities regulators and not changing the current
treatment of individual lawsuits.
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000). The SLUSA provides that any covered class action brought in state
court shall be removable to the federal district court. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c).
185. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430-32 (1964). Even the United States
Supreme Court recognized early on that the SEC cannot review every public filing for evi-
dence of fraud and that private civil enforcement efforts can be more effective. Id.
186. See, e.g., Colleen DeBaise, Judge Dismisses Lawsuits Against Analyst Meeker,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2001, at C13 (describing dismissal of complaint where emphasis of
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abuses in Rule 1Ob-5 actions, they limit the amount of frivolous securities
fraud lawsuits.
IV. REASONING
In Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United International Holdings, Inc.,'87 a
unanimous United States Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and held that Wharf acted fraudulently in
the sale of an oral option to buy stock and that this violated section 10(b)
and Rule I Ob-5's prohibition against fraud in connection with the sale of a
security.188 The Court began its analysis in Wharf by stating the issue that it
would address: whether selling an oral option to buy stock while secretly
intending never to honor the option violated section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.89 The Court determined that to succeed in a Rule
1Ob-5 action, the plaintiff must prove that the "defendant used, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a security, one of the four kinds of manipu-
lative or deceptive devices to which the Rule refers."' 90 Such deceptive de-
vices mentioned in the rule include any device to defraud, any untrue state-
ment of a material fact, any omission of material fact, and any other act to
defraud. 191
For the Court to determine whether Rule 1Ob-5 applied to the circum-
stances of this case, it had to establish what security was at issue. 192 The
Court held that the security at bar was not the stock for the cable system, but
rather the option to purchase that stock.193 This holding was consistent with
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934's language that defines a security to
include both "any ... option.., on any security" and "any... right to...
purchase" stock.194 The Court refused to give attention to Wharf's effort to
deny its concession of the applicable security.' 
95
Consequently, the Court addressed the issue of whether Wharf's secret
intent to not honor the oral option amounted to a "deceptive device" under
complaint was popular outcry rather than proof of wrongdoing or intent to deceive).
187. 532 U.S. 588 (2001).
188. Id. at 590.
189. Id. at 589-90.
190. Id. at 593; see supra note 8.
191. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 593.
192. Id.
193. Id. The Court reached this conclusion fairly easily because Wharf conceded to this
point at the Tenth Circuit. Id. "Wharf does not contest on appeal the classification of the
option as a security." United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207,
1221 (10th Cir. 2000).
194. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 593 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2000)).
195. Id. at 594.
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section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5.196 The Court split its analysis into two sub-
parts: (1) whether the materially false and misleading statements were in
connection with the sale or purchase of a security, and (2) whether section
10(b) applies to an oral agreement. 197 Wharf strongly urged that Rule 1Ob-5
does not apply to oral agreements and that because of the actual purchase or
sale requirement in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 98 the oral
options agreement was outside section 10(b)'s coverage. 199 However, the
Court rejected Wharf's argument because, unlike the potential purchasers of
securities in Blue Chip Stamps, United actually purchased a security in the
present case-the option to buy securities at a later date.200 Thus, Wharf's
material misstatements were in connection with a securities transaction, and
therefore, within the purview of Rule 1 Ob-5.2° 1
The Court further held that there was no credible rationale to interpret
Rule lOb-5 to exclude oral contracts as a protected class.20 2 To the contrary,
it specifically protects "any contract" for the sale or purchase of securi-
ties.203 The Court reasoned that oral contracts for the sale of a security are a
common enforceable right. 204 Therefore, any limits placed on oral agree-
ments to purchase or sell securities would considerably undermine the Act's
basic purpose by narrowing its scope.
205
Next, the Court emphasized that any fraudulent scheme used in securi-
ties transactions must affect the value of the security.20 6 The Court ex-
plained that here, Wharf's secret intent not to honor United's option to pur-
chase stock was materially misleading because a buyer presumes good faith
on the part of the option's seller.20 7 Consequently, any secret reservation not
to honor the option renders it valueless.2 8
The final issue the Court faced was whether interpreting Rule 1 Ob-5 to
cover oral options would cause an increase in litigation of federal securities
claims that are no more than normal state law breach of contract claims.
209
The Court distinguished the case at bar from an ordinary contract claim
because Wharf actually sold United a security while intending not to honor
196. Id.
197. Id. at 593-95.
198. 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
199. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 594.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 595.
202. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13)-(14) (2000).
203. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 595 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13)-(14)).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 596.
207: Id.
208. Id.
209. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 596.
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it, which is different than Wharf just failing to carry out a promise to sell
securities. 210 The Court relied on the PSLRA to justify its conclusion that
there is no need to protect the federal courts from excessive litigation. l1
The Court held that Rule lOb-5's breadth includes an oral option for the sale
of securities with the secret intent to never honor it.
212
V. SIGNIFICANCE
In Wharf, the United States Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
largest Colorado jury award in history-$67 million in compensatory dam-
ages and $58.5 million in punitive damages, along with an additional $75
million in post judgment interest-a total of $200 million.213 The only out-
of-pocket economic loss shown by United was less than one million dollars
in expenditures incurred for services rendered.21 4
Most would agree that securities antifraud regulation is important-it
promotes fair investment practices and encourages fair business practices.
Furthermore, securities antifraud regulation seeks to increase proficiency
and productivity. However, on occasion, securities regulation results in a
windfall judgment such as that recovered in Wharf
Rule lOb-5 was overbroad at its inception. A thirty-year trend shows
that the judiciary has consistently narrowed the overly broad scope of Rule
lOb-5 and its blanket language protecting victims of fraudulent practices.
Congress eventually intervened fearing the adverse affects of Rule lOb-5's
broad reach. In doing so, Congress passed the PSLRA and later the SLUSA.
These laws protect defendants from the abusive uses of Rule lob-5. In
Wharf the United States Supreme Court relied on the PSLRA and turned
away from its trend of narrowly interpreting Rule l0b-5. A deeper look at
the Wharf decision will disclose several tiers of significance. First, as a Rule
lOb-5 case, Wharfprovides for a broader reading of Rule 1Ob-5. Second, the
Court refuses to address an important unresolved issue as to the potential
federalization of basic state law breach of contract claims. Finally, the
Court's holding unintentionally rewards sloppy business practices.
A. Changing Directions and Relying on the PSLRA
On a superficial level the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Wharf is brief and unremarkable, except perhaps for the fact that it was
unanimous. Nevertheless, because it was based as a policy matter on the
210. Id.
211. Id. at 597; see also supra Part III.C.1.
212. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 593-97.
213. Accola, supra note 66, at lB.
214. See Brief of Petitioner at 19, Wharf (No. 00-347).
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enactment of the PSLRA, it marks a turning point in the Court's jurispru-
dence with regard to Rule 1 Ob-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
For approximately thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the overly broad scope of Rule lOb-5, case by case.215 In Wharf, the
Court finally allowed the implied private right of action to rest on Con-
gress's efforts of reform. Prior to both the PSLRA and SLUSA, the outcome
of Wharf may have differed tremendously.
Because Congress enacted legislation requiring certain heightened re-
quirements for pleading a Rule 1Ob-5 cause of action and requiring class
action Rule 1 Ob-5 suits to be brought in federal court, the judiciary does not
have to decide the question of whether allowing the plaintiff to recover will
open the floodgates of litigation. Furthermore, the Court is showing faith in
the legislature,21 6 and by doing so allows courts to focus on standardizing
Rule 1Ob-5 by eliminating outside consequences including litigation in-
creases and abusive class action suits as factors in the analysis. The holding
in Wharf may encourage courts to give a more literal reading to Rule 1 Ob-5,
so long as the PSLRA's requirements can be met.
B. Misopportunity: An Important Unresolved Issue
Wharf tried making the security at issue not the oral option, but the
stock in the cable system. Wharf was unsuccessful because the Court re-
garded the option as the security, a moot point considering that Wharf had
conceded this before the Tenth Circuit.2 7 This, in turn, made it relatively
easy for the Court to reach its decision because the option was obviously
valueless given Wharfs intent to dishonor it.
218
Every contract to sell or purchase a security, however, is not a security,
and the Court's opinion does not directly answer the broader issue of
whether a contractual promise to sell or purchase a security that the promi-
sor does not intend or only conditionally intends to perform is within the
scope of Rule 1Ob-5. Justice Breyer was not concerned that the decision in
Wharf might federalize breach of contract actions involving the purchase or
sale of securities. 219 He rejected the notion that the Court's decision would
allow Rule lOb-5 claims "outside the [1934] Act's basic objectives" by al-
lowing claims "that are in reality no more than ordinary state breach of con-
215. See supra Part III.B.
216. This is important given the Court's recent revival of separation of powers concerns.
See generally Keith Werhan, Checking Congress and Balancing Federalism: A Lesson from
Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1213, 1215 (2000).
217. Wharf, 532 U.S. at 593.




tract claims., 220 The Court then, by relying on the PSLRA, actually moved
away from its intended purpose. Because of Wharf, there will be an increase
in federal lawsuits for acts that are merely state breach of contract claims.
C. Rewarding Sloppy Business Practices: An Unintended Consequence
Finally, the United States Supreme Court rewarded United for acting
recklessly and sloppily in its business dealings. Both parties, Wharf and
United, are sophisticated companies that have been in similar dealings
throughout their course of business with each other. Despite its experience,
United never managed to get an oral agreement amounting to such great
proportions-partial ownership of the Hong Kong cable system-in writing,
and in fact only signed the agreement that identified United as an independ-
ent contractor.22 1 Both companies had many opportunities to reach a com-
promise, and each time failed to do so. This lack of reaching a written
agreement is clear evidence that the parties never reached the mutual assent
required to form an enforceable oral options contract. United, without any
concrete confirmation such as a written agreement, continued to render ser-
vices to Wharf. Moreover, Wharf explained that it required approval of its
board before United could obtain any ownership rights in the cable sys-
22tem. 22 The facts clearly show that Wharf never obtained approval from its
board.223 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, with another
agenda, rewarded United in order to show its reliance on the PSLRA and to
depart from its earlier trend of narrowly interpreting the scope of Rule 1Ob-
5. Sometimes, cases that seem rather easy and clear may lead to a bad result,
such as ruling in favor of an irresponsible company. 224 In Wharf, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed a $200 million windfall judgment and by




221. United Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d 1207, 1215-16 (10th
Cir. 2000).
222. Id. at 1218.
223. Id. at 1219.
224. United's cost for relying on the oral agreement was only one million dollars, and
Wharf affirmed a nearly $200 million jury verdict in its favor. See supra text accompanying
notes 218-19.
225. Id.
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